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Mohamad Roem, one of the most highly respected of Indonesia's leaders, died in 
his home in Jakarta on September 24, 1983 at the age of 75. Never at the top of the 
pyramid of power, he was heavily relied upon by some who were, and during the 
course of the revolution he emerged as his country's ablest diplomat. He was one of 
the leaders of the revolution whom I respected most, and our friendship began with 
our first meeting in Yogyakarta in 1948. Intrinsically Roem was a modest man, known 
for his openness, absolute honesty, gentleness of manner, and thoughtful regard for 
others. Many were struck by how genuinely concerned he was to understand the 
views of those with whom he interacted, whatever their religion— whether in his home 
or at the negotiating table. But there was also a formidable inner iron to his char­
acter that derived from his strong and unflagging adherence to principle. These 
qualities and an unobtrusive astuteness were what finally brought the Dutch to con­
clude that Roem was their toughest Indonesian adversary at the negotiating table. 
From these attributes, too, stemmed his unusual capacity to serve as mediator and 
conciliator among diverse political factions within Islamic organizations and more 
broadly in the various cabinets in which he served.
Mohamad Roem was born on May 16, 1908, son of the lurah of Klewogan desa on 
the outskirts of the town of Parakan in Central Java. His father sent him to a secu­
lar primary school and then, from 1917 to 1924, Roem attended the Hollandsch-In- 
landsche Schools (H IS ) in Temanggung and Pekalongan. In 1924 he passed govern­
ment examinations that won him a scholarship to the S TO V IA  in the Weltevreden 
suburb of Batavia. There after three years he completed the preliminary exams in 
this medical training course and transferred to a Dutch AMS (Middle School) in 
Batavia from which he graduated in 1930. After trying unsuccessfully to pass the 
examinations for entry to the Medical College, he turned to law, entering the Rechts 
Hooge School in Batavia in 1932, and graduating in 1939.
In the meantime, Roem had become politically active in the nationalist movement. 
At a 1929 congress in Surabaya of the Jong Islamieten Bond ( J IB )— an offshoot of 
the nationalist organization, Jong Java (Young Java)— he met Markisah Dahlia, whom 
he married three years later. That marriage was an unusually happy one. The young 
Markisah Dahlia, too, was an active nationalist, and she was strongly supportive of 
Roem's work throughout his career. They had two children— a boy, Roemoso, born 
in 1933 and a g irl, Rumeisa, born in 1939.
In 1930 Roem was made head of one of the central committees of the JIB where 
he came to know H. O . S. Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim. In 1932 he began to 
play an active role in the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (P S II), where he adhered 
to the more moderate wing of Haji Agus Salim, which believed that the nationalist 
cause would be best served by working within the very limited representative insti­
tutions permitted by the Dutch. When this minority faction emerged in November 
1936 as the Barisan Penyadar PSII (League to make the PSII conscious) Roem headed 
its Central Executive Committee, and remained active in it until the Japanese banned 
political organizations. During the occupation he quietly continued to practice law
135
136
insofar as conditions permitted, and managed to live in relative obscurity until early 
1945 when he was appointed vice-chairman of the Masjumi's Hizbullah.
Roem headed the Jakarta Komite Nasional Indonesia, the Republic's representa­
tive body for that city, when it was established soon after the proclamation of Indo­
nesian independence. In the early months of their occupation, the British permitted 
some Dutch (N IC A ) forces to land behind the shield of the British Indian Arm y, 
which sometimes proved unable to control these often aggressive and trigger-happy 
Dutch troops. On November 21, 1945 a group of these Dutch soldiers forced their 
way into Roem's house at Jalan Kwitang #10, shot him in the right leg, and abducted 
a friend who had come to dinner. Though appeals were made to the British authori­
ties for an investigation, the perpetrators were never brought to justice, and Roem's 
friend was never seen again. After several months of convalescence from what 
proved to be a very serious wound, Roem emerged with his right leg shorter than 
his left, and a permanent limp.
As a representative of the Republic's largest Islamic party, the Masjumi, Roem 
held the important position of Minister of Interior in the third Sjahrir cabinet (Octo­
ber 2, 1946-June 27, 1947), and in the second cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin (Novem­
ber 11, 1947-January 29, 1948). In Hatta's RUSI cabinet he served as minister 
without portfolio from December 20, 1949 until he was appointed High Commissioner 
to The Hague on January 19, 1950. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
cabinet led by Mohammad Natsir (September 6, 1950-April 27, 1951), and as Minis­
ter of Internal Affairs in that led by Wilopo of the PNI (April 3, 1952-August 1, 
1953). He was First Deputy Prime Minister in the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet 
from March 26, 1956 until he and four other Masjumi members resigned on January 
9, 1957.
In the field of foreign affairs Roem also played an important role as a member of 
the Republic's delegation to the Linggadjati and Renville Conferences; and in the 
crucial discussions with the Dutch during the spring of 1949 he was its principal 
negotiator. These negotiations culminated in the Roem-Van Royen Agreement of 
May 7, 1949. While a major and essential step on the way to the Round Table Con­
ference wherein the Dutch finally yielded their claim to sovereignty, the agreement 
at the time was highly controversial. Even some of the Masjumi and PSI leaders who 
had been close to Roem believed he had made too many concessions to the Dutch in 
achieving it. He, however, clearly had a keener perception of the realities of Dutch 
domestic politics than they, and was convinced he had secured as much for the Re­
public as the Netherlands government could accept. Backed by Hatta and Sukarno, 
he was able to prevail. And the Roem-Van Royen Agreement did lead to the return 
in early July of the Republic's top leaders from Bangka where they had been in­
terned following the Dutch capture of Yogyakarta on December 19, 1948. This was 
followed by a cease-fire in mid-August, and the final round of negotiations at the 
Round Table Conference held under the auspices of the UN's Good Offices Committee 
at The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949.
One cannot go through recently declassified US government documents bearing 
on the Round Table Conference without appreciating Roem's central role there. The 
Dutch clearly regarded Roem as a formidable negotiator, as did Merle Cochran, the 
American representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (U N C I), 
who perceived Roem as holding "a key position" particularly with regard to his 
opposition to further concessions to the Dutch. Roem's effectiveness was undoubt­
edly enhanced by his realistic assessment of Cochran. He had taken the measure of 
this pivotal member of the UNCI more accurately than most other members of the 
Indonesian negotiating team. Although respecting Cochran's negotiating ability, 
Roem did not bank on the assumption that he would secure the best terms possible 
for Indonesia, particularly with regard to the question of the proportion of the Dutch
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East Indies' debt the successor independent Indonesian state should be obliged to 
take over. A debt settlement that was reasonably beneficial to the Netherlands was 
obviously in harmony with the Europe-centric policy of the US at the time, and it 
was for such a settlement that Cochran pressed and which he ultimately secured.
Cochran's strategy in achieving such a debt settlement was to gain for himself 
sole rfesponsibility for mediating the issue between the Dutch and Indonesian repre­
sentatives, rather than sharing this function with the other members of UN CI. In 
order to block this move, Roem strove hard, but unsuccessfully, to promote a com­
promise formula whereby UNCI as a whole would assume responsibility for the medi­
ating role, with Cochran acting as its agent but remaining accountable to its full 
membership. (Only after Cochran had had his way with the issue of the debt settle­
ment did Roem and his supporters finally manage to reestablish UNCI in its proper 
role.) With Cochran occupying the pivotal role as mediator, the new Indonesian 
state was obliged to shoulder 70 percent— 4.3 billion guilders (approximately 
$1,130,000,000)— of the debt of colonial Indonesia, which totaled altogether 6.1 bil­
lion guilders ($1,732,400,000). Members of the Indonesian delegation particularly 
resented the fact that most of the debt they were required to assume represented 
military expenses generated by the Dutch effort to subdue the Republic. Denied 
access to the details of the Netherlands Indies budget, Roem found it difficult to 
make his case. But the correctness of his argument is supported by a report to the 
Department of State of January 3, 1950 from the US Consul General in Jakarta, Jacob 
Beam, that recently came into my possession. This incorporates a breakdown of the 
internal Dutch East Indies budget for 1949, which shows that in that year alone more 
than a billion guilders was spent on the Dutch armed forces (964.6 million guilders 
on the Army and 77.2 million guilders for the N avy). Another 125 million guilders 
were spent on the police (not including the cost of the Marine Police and the police 
of the Dutch-sponsored states). Since the total budget for 1949 alone was in deficit 
by 1,304,900,000 guilders, it is evident that a substantial part of the internal debt 
assumed by the Indonesian government did indeed derive from the military effort 
mounted by the Dutch against the Republic. Had Roem's judgment prevailed, Indo­
nesia would probably have secured significantly better terms.
In Indonesia's internal politics Roem's personal qualities enabled him to serve as 
a bridge to understanding and compromise among individuals and groups with differ­
ing perceptions of important and often critical problems. Within his own party, the 
Masjumi, he must be credited with making a significant contribution to maintaining 
coherence among its often disparate elements. But his influence as a force for con­
sensus transcended his party and was exercised much more broadly in the Indone­
sian political community. He did not, of course, always prevail, but one cannot 
help but be impressed by how persistently he labored, even in the most exacting of 
situations. One of the most difficult challenges came in the 1957-58 PRRI rebellion. 
He worked hard, with great political understanding and skill, in seeking a mutually 
acceptable compromise among the disputants. In the end he was unsuccessful, but 
I believe he came as close to success as anyone could. Had the dissident military 
commanders been less committed externally and a bit more flexible, or had Prime 
Minister Djuanda and Sukarno been a little more patient, his efforts might have 
averted the tragedy that ensued.
He made clear his opposition to Sukarno's system of "Guided Democracy" and 
was among those leaders of the Masjumi and PSI who attended the Anak Agung's 
convocation on Bali in August 1961, ostensibly held to celebrate the cremation of 
Agung's father. The President learned that some of those present at the ceremonies 
held discussions as to the nature of a post-Sukarno Indonesia, and when a few 
months later he was the object of an assassination attempt in Makassar, Sukarno's 
suspicions regarding the Bali meetings precipitated moves against the top Masjumi
138
and Indonesian Socialist Party leaders. (There was certainly no evidence that Roem 
was guilty of the charge of plotting Sukarno's overthrow that was leveled against 
the group, but Sukarno appears to have suspected all of Anak Agung's guests.) 
Roem was arrested in January 1962, together with Anak Agung, the Masjumi's Pra- 
woto Mangkusasmito, and the PSI leaders Sutan Sjahrir and Subadio Sastrosatomo. 
After three months of interrogation in Jakarta they were imprisoned in Madiun, 
where the former Masjumi leaders Isa Ansjari and Yunan Nasution soon joined them. 
(During the last seven months of this imprisonment the prominent writer and jour­
nalist Mochtar Lubis joined the group.)
It tells something of Roem's character that these comrades in detention elected 
him to be their "lurah" (village head), with the responsibility of dealing in their be­
half with the prison authorities. The confidence Roem's comrades had in his diplo­
matic abilities was not misplaced. Admittedly, political detainees during the Sukarno 
period were normally better treated than common criminals, but, so far as I am aware, 
none ever won the concessions that Roem negotiated for his little group. Starting 
with improvements in their living quarters and food, he moved on to secure a bad­
minton court, a weekly movie in their quarters, and finally weekly visits to a local 
movie theater, and to a nearby swimming pool. In early November 1965 the entire 
group was moved briefly to the Jakarta Military Detention Center, and then to a 
large house near Glodok where they remained under house arrest until their release 
in May 1966.
Like many other former Islamic leaders, Roem assumed that Suharto would lift 
the ban on the Masjumi that Sukarno had imposed,and that scope would be given for 
the establishment of a new modernist Muslim party by those whom Sukarno had 
jailed. He was, however, soon disappointed. Though by acclamation he was chosen 
to head the newly established Partai Muslimin at its congress in Malang on November 
7, 1968, President Suharto overruled this decision, and Roem was denied the possi­
bility of resuming an active role in politics. The Partai Muslimin (Parmusi) became 
an obedient instrument of the government.
Deeply disappointed in being shut out of any possibility of playing a construc­
tive political role, Roem devoted most of his remaining years to study and writing, 
making trips to the United States and Holland in connection with these. Already in 
February 1968 he and his wife had visited Cornell for six weeks as the guests of 
the Modern Indonesia Project, where Roem ran a seminar on modern and recent Indo­
nesian history. Unassuming and patient, Roem gave his time unstintingly to faculty 
and students. He deepened their understanding of the Islamic leadership's perspec­
tive on Indonesia's problems and history, and at the same time, both he and his 
wife through their kindness and generosity made warm and lasting friendships.
Through his writings on post-colonial Indonesia's political and diplomatic history 
Roem has significantly enriched that record. His major works were his three vol­
umes of Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah, but he also devoted much effort to promoting 
memorial volumes describing the political contributions of some of Indonesia's out­
standing leaders. He was still actively occupied with this writing when he died, 
and it was fitting that the last memorial volume commemorated Haji Agus Salim, the 
man to whom he had stood so close during the nationalist phase of his political career.
Mohamad Roem's persistent modesty has probably obscured for the present gen­
eration of Indonesians his significant and sustained contribution to the revolution 
and the post-revolutionary decade. But when that history is fully elaborated the 
importance of his role will be clearly evident.
